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Abstract. Kosovo has recently signed two major trade agreements, the SAA with the EU, 
andan FTA with Turkey. However, as the experience from developing countries shows, 
trade liberalisation is a precondition, but it does not ensure economic growth and 
prosperity, especially when the supply-side constraints limit country’s ability to reap the 
benefits of free trade. Violencein the nineties; years of underperforming post-war 
institutions; the neglect of policy reforms, especially poorly managed privatisation process; 
reduced greatly Kosovo’s industrial base and its manufacturing capacities. Moreover, these 
factors, coupled with problems with the rule of law, produced a high-risk environment that 
is deterring the inflow of foreign capital. Following the signing of the two agreements, one 
can expect that Kosovo will become more attractive tothe European and Turkish investors. 
In addition to other benefits, the flow of foreign capital may enable Kosovo’s industries to 
integrate intothe global value chains. However, as with free trade, the impact of FDI inflow 
and the integration into global value chains depend largely on domestic market conditions. 
This paper provides a discussion on the developments regarding trade liberalisation and 
FDI, and the opportunities the latter create on the integration of Kosovo’s industries into 
global production networks. In terms of policy directions, the paper argues that, although 
the trade liberalisation will act as a pull factor, the existingstructural impediments in 
Kosovo will mostlikely limit the flow of foreign capital and the impact of the existing FDI 
in Kosovo, specifically, integration into global value chains.  
Keywords. Trade liberalisation, FDI, GVC, Kosovo. 
JEL. F15, F23, F60. 
 
1. Introduction 
inancial and economic integration into the world economy proved to be critical 
to the revival of the former-communist Central European countries (European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], 2009). The region 
recorded high and sustainable growth rates until late 2000 steaming largely from the 
increased international competitiveness and FDI inflows. However, in the Western 
Balkans results differ significantly. The same free market policies have been 
employed, but economic growth in Western Balkans countries has been rather shaky. 
At least at the initial stage of transition, the failure can be explained by the political 
turmoil that hit the region following the break-up of Yugoslavia. A series of armed 
conflicts delayed the start of the transformational reforms by almost a decade. As a 
result, the meaningful reforms started in early 2000, while the economic integration 
was high on the regional agenda. The EU, led by its own example, was pressing for a 
free trade area in the region, with the view that the integration would reduce the 
animosities between the peoples of Western Balkans created by the conflicts of the 
previous decade. The EU went even further, by conditioning the process of regional 
integration in Western Balkans to the process of the EU membership, giving the 
former a whole new dimension.  
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Western Balkan countries, including Kosovo, endorsed fully the process of trade 
liberalization. After years of negotiations, countries of the Western Balkansbecame 
members of Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which, in its new 
format, entered into force in 2007. CEFTA resulted in a removal of all tariff barriers 
in goods between member countries. In addition, during 2000, countries of the 
Western Balkans embarked on a wider liberalisation, including the liberalisation of 
trade with the EU and the membership in WTO. In this decade, all Western Balkans 
countries signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. Due 
to political reasons, Kosovo lagged behind; the SAA between the EU and Kosovo 
has entered into force on April 1, 2016.  With regards to WTO, Albania, Croatia, and 
Macedonia became members in 2000, followed by Montenegro in 2012. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serbia are in advanced stages of accession process, while Kosovo, 
as a latecomer, has not made a formal application yet. On a final note, other 
liberalisation steps for the most of Western Balkans’ countries include EFTA 
membership, and other bilateral agreements, notably with Turkey. Kosovo has 
negotiated an FTA with Turkey but the entry into force awaits the ratification by the 
Kosovo Parliament.  
In addition to the integration processes, Kosovo, as other countries in the 
region, embarked on significant structural reforms. As a result, the business climate 
is getting better, while the private sector is taking off; a significant number of old 
socially owned enterprises have been privatised, and a vibrant SME sector 
hasemerged. Gradually, the flow of foreign investments is increasing, partially due 
to the opportunities offered, but also the incentives providedby the government.  
However, none of these resembles the success observed in the Central 
Europiancountries. The economic integration of the region did not produce the 
expected results, especially in the case of Kosovo. Impediments to free flow of 
goods, especially in a form of NTBs, are widespread. The negotiations within 
CEFTA on the liberalisation of services have been concluded. The signals received 
from Brussels regarding the EU membership are not clear. It is not only the limited 
integration, but these countries have been lagging on the institutional reforms. 
Against this backdrop, foreign investors still attach a high degree of risk to Western 
Balkans, and particularly Kosovo. As a result, growth rates remain moderate, 
unemployment is high, and poverty is still widespread.  
In this paper, we concentrate on the developments related to trade liberalisation 
between Kosovo and the EU through SAA, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, between Kosovo and Turkey. Particularly, the paper brings together a 
discussion on trade integration and FDI, and how the latter two can support Kosovo 
industries to integrate in global value chains (GVC), with particular emphasis on 
the EU and Turkish production networks. In the final part, the discussion 
concentrates on structural impediments Kosovo faces in order to attract FDI and 
integrate into GVCs. 
 
2. Kosovo’s trade and investment relations with the EU and 
Turkey 
2.1. Trade developments1 
As pointed out earlier, Kosovo has made significant steps in liberalizing its 
economy, notably trade. The benefits from trade liberalisation are potentially far 
reaching, both static and dynamic. In terms of GVC, trade liberalisation is a 
precondition for local producers to integrate into global production networks, and 
climb up the value ladder. However, the huge and persisting trade deficit in goods 
raises serious challenges to policymakers in Kosovo (Table 1 presents the situation 
in the external sector of Kosovo). Together with high rates of unemployment, the 
external position of Kosovo remains the single most pressing issue for the country. 
Despite this situation, the liberal paradigm continues to act as overriding mode of 
 
1 The analysis in this section relies largely on Ministry of Trade and Industry [MTI] (2015) co-
authored by the author of this paper. 
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thinking within policy-making circles in Kosovo. As a result, Kosovo in the last 
few years has negotiatiated two trade deals with its major trade partners, namely 
the EU and Turkey.  
 
Table 1. Kosovo’s external trade indicators 
Indicators 2008 2011 2014 
Exports of goods and services (current, m. €) 595.4 944.4 1095.2 
Goods exports (current, m €) 198.5 319.2 324.6 
Service exports (current, m €) 396.9 625.2 770.6 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 15.1 19.8 19.9 
Imports of goods and services (current, m €) 2,178.5  2,861.2  2,972.7  
Goods imports (current, m €) 1,928.2  2,492.4  2,538.2  
Service imports (current, m €) 250.3 368.9 434.5 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 55.3 59.9 54.0 
Trade balance on goods and services (current, m €) -1,583.2 -1,916.9 -1,877.6 
Trade balance in goods (current, m €) 1,729.8 2,173.2 2,213.7 
Trade balance in services (current, m €) 146.6 256.3 336.1 
Source: Central Bank of Kosovo (various years) 
 
The geography of Kosovo’s trade has remained fairly similar in the post-war years. 
The EU block is the largest trading partner of Kosovo. Over the last ten years, Kosovo 
has been exporting, on average, around 40 per cent of its production to the EU 
countries. The EU market is followed by neighbouring countries, which constitute, on 
average, 37 per cent of the total exports, over the period 2005 – 2014. Recently, 
Kosovo businesses have begun moving more towards other and more distant markets, 
especially Turkey, China and India. Imports, on the other hand, show similar 
tendencies as exports: the structure of partners is similar. Again, two major trading 
blocks, the EU and CEFTA countries, dominate import structure. On average, together 
they constitute over 80 per cent of total goods imports, over 2005 - 2014. Countries 
such as Turkey, China, Switzerland, USA, etc. cover the rest of total import in goods 
(see table below).  
 
Table 2. Kosovo’s exports and imports of goods with the EU and Turkey (current, m. €) 
Indicators 2012 2013 2014 
Exports with the EU  199.9 204.9 238.3 
Imports with the EU  1,050.1 1,083.2 1,081.1 
Trade balance with the EU  -850.20 -878.30 -842.80 
Exports with Turkey  11.4 7.4 10.4 
Imports with Turkey  199.9 204.9 238.3 
Trade balance with Turkey  -188.50 -197.50 -227.90 
Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics (various years) 
 
In April 2016 the SAA between Kosovo and the EU entered into force. The deal 
is of immense importance for Kosovo as it represents the first contractual 
relationship between the partners, and it is seen as an important milestone in 
Kosovo’s European integration process. Beyond political implications, the largest 
portion of the SAA concentrates on the liberalisation of goods. According to the 
Agreement, all Kosovo products are immediately exempted form customs duty, 
except baby beef, sugar, and wine, which are subject to quantitative restrictions. On 
the other hand, Kosovo will phase out custom duties according to specific 
transitional periods (from five to ten years). Kosovo has entered into an agreement 
with 99.7% of Kosovo products, thus 0.3% of products are not part of the SAA (see 
discussion comparing the SAA and FTA with Turkey). 
On the 27th of September 2013, the Republic of Kosovo signed a Free Trade 
Agreement with Turkey. This agreement guarantees Kosovo’s exporters duty-free 
access to the Turkish market for 8,336 industrial products. In exchange, Kosovo 
has agreed to eliminate customs duty for 2,292 industrial products with immediate 
effect. These are largely the products either not produced in Kosovo or lacking a 
significant potential for development. With regard to the agricultural 
products, Kosovo has negotiated the abolishment of customs duties for 2,442 
products, except for meat. In return, Kosovo will immediately abolish customs duty 
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on only 493 agricultural imports from Turkey. Kosovo will protect for additional 
10 years 52 other agricultural products, considered to be sensitive and within 
Kosovo’s comparative advantages. 
However, although Kosovo committed to only reducing customs duties 
progressively, the fiscal implication, as shown in the next figure, will be significant. The 
calculations have been based on the assumption that both agreements will enter into force 
in 2016.  
As the figure shows, the FTA with Turkey imposes significantly less tariff 
reduction commitments upon Kosovo than the SAA. Before the entry into force of 
the SAA, the average nominal tariff rate was 8.03 per cent for all imports. Once the 
SAA entered into force the average nominal tariff rate for EU imports dropped 
sharply by 2.5 per cent, to then taper off to nearly 0 per cent over the next nine 
years. The initial sharp drop was expected as the tariff on over 70 per cent of the 
product lines have been abolished immediately (see Table 3). Apart from 14 tariff 
lines that have been excluded from negotiations, the rest of tariff lines will be 
abolished progressively over 10 years: around 17 per cent of product lines within 
five years; less than 13 per cent over seven years; and only 0.13 per cent in ten 
years. 
 
 
Figure 1. Average nominal tariff rates for EU and Turkey before and after agreements enter 
into force 
Source: Author’s calculations based on KAS (2015) data. 
Note: Averages have been calculated based on the total number of tariff lines in Kosovo 
 
Customs’ Tariff Code (TARIK) of 2012. The same has been used to negotiate 
with the EU and Turkey counterparts. 
 
Table 3. The schedule of concessions granted in the SAA and the FTA with Turkey 
Sectors  
SAA with EU FTA with Turkey 
Schedules 
(years) 
Products covered 
(HS-8 digit) 
Schedules (years) Products covered 
(HS-8 digit) 
Agriculture Sector 
Zero 1,204 Zero 433 
Five 353 Six 214 
Seven 180 Eight 39 
Ten 8 Ten 19 
- - Ten-A 16 
Excluded 11 Excluded 1,035 
Processed 
Agriculture Products 
(PAPs) 
Zero 135 Zero 69 
Five 98 Six 94 
Seven 76 Eight 32 
Ten 4 Ten 6 
- - Ten-A 10 
Excluded 3 Excluded 105 
Fish Products  
Zero 490 Zero 29 
Five 1 Six 6 
Seven 1 Ten 1 
Excluded 0 Excluded 456 
Industrial products  
Zero 4,763 Zero 2,254 
Five 1,131 Four 210 
Seven 925 Six 1,234 
- - Eight 2,651 
- - Ten 470 
 Excluded 0 Excluded 0 
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In the case of Turkey, once the agreements enters into force, the immediate drop 
in the average tariff rates will not be as sharp as in the case of SAA. This is largely 
because only 30 per cent of tariff lines will be abolished completely once the FTA 
enters into force. Also, 17 per cent of tariff lines were excluded altogether from 
negotiations. According to the agreement, the majority of tariffs will be abolished 
within eight years, that is, 29 per cent, followed by 16.5 per cent of lines that will 
be abolished within six years. For 5.5 per cent of products tariffs will be reduced 
progressively within 10 years; only a fraction of products has been granted a grace 
period of two years (classified within Ten-A category), whereby the progressive 
reduction will start in the third year following the entry into force of the FTA.         
Table3 shows also that for around 70 per cent of agriculture and industrial 
products tariff duties will be abolished once the SAA enters into force. The rest will 
be abolished progressively within five to seven years. For Processed Agriculture 
Products (PAP)the picture is much the same, while the fishery sector will be almost 
fully liberalised once the Agreement enters into force. In the latter case, only two 
product lines will enjoy gradual tariff reductions within five and seven years.  
In the case of the FTA with Turkey, the situation is rather different: around 60 per 
cent of agriculture products have been excluded from negotiations, while only about 25 
per cent of all tariff lines will be abolished once the Agreements enters into force. For 
the rest of products, the reductions will be completed within six and eight years. Again 
we see a rather similar picture regarding PAPs, while the majority of fish products have 
not even been included in negotiations because presumably there was no major 
production from either party. Only 33 per cent of industrial products will have zero 
tariff rate once the Agreement enters into force, while the tariff for the remaining 
product lines will be reduced progressively over six to eight years. 
 
2.2. FDI flows 
The literature generally points to the positive effects capital flows have on the level 
of development. The literature argues that FDI contribute substantially to gross fixed 
capital formation, GDP growth, and enterprise restructuring. In addition, FDI generate 
employment, promote exports, diversify and upgrade industries. Another benefit from 
FDI is the option it provides to local industries to integrate into global production 
networks. The evidence is overwhelming; according to a joint report from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Trade Organization 
and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [OECD/WTO/UNCTAD] 
(2013) analyzing the implications of GVC on trade, investment, development and jobs. 
The study argues that“the expansion of the operations of MNEs through FDI has been 
a major driver of growth of GVCs, as illustrated by the close correlation between FDI 
stocks in countries and their GVC participation” (p.9). Specifically, the study argues, 
the presence of foreign affiliates is clearly an important factor influencing participation 
in international production networks.  
The evidence on the effects of FDI on Kosovo’s economy is rather scarce. 
However, the aggregate data show some interesting tendencies. Although as a whole, 
the EU has been the biggest foreign investor in Kosovo for the last few years, still, 
Turkey, individually, is the biggest FDI contributor to Kosovo (see Table 4). The main 
EU contributor is Germany, with almost €300 million in stock of investments, followed 
by Slovenia, Austria and Holland.  
 
Table 4. Kosovo’s stock of FDI in the post war years (selected countries; in m. €) 
Country Amount 
European Union 1,101.6 
Germany 299.5 
Slovenia 222.3 
Austria 183.4 
Holland 162.6 
Great Britain  64.5 
Bulgaria 33.2 
Other EU 136.0 
Turkey  351.4 
Source: Central Bank of Kosovo (various years) 
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The geographical composition of net FDI flows over years is provided in the 
table below.  As the data show, particularly the year 2014 has evidenced a sharp 
drop in foreign investments. The outflow in countries such as Great Britain, 
Holland, and Slovenia has been significant. In other years, the level of foreign 
investments remains largely the same. One should note that the greatest flow of 
FDI has been registered in 2007 with around €450 million euros. These flows are 
largely related to the privatisation of the former socially owned enterprises. 
However, even the privatisation process has been able to attract a substantial 
amount of the EU and Turkish capital. The EU investors have concluded only 5.5 
per cent of the total privatisation deals in Kosovo. One could add to this figure 
additional 9 per cent of the deals involving Kosovo’s Diaspora that is 
overwhelmingly residing in the EU countries.2 Otherwise, over the years, Kosovo’s 
Diaspora has been very active in investing in Kosovo. 
 
Table 5. Net flow of FDI in Kosovo (selected countries; in m. €) 
 
2008 2011 2014 2015 
Germany 44.0 66.6 29.4 45.3 
Slovenia 44.3 16.2 -9.4 5.6 
Austria 51.3 19.6 30.3 33.5 
Holland 25.9 4.7 -7.8 -24.1 
Great Britain  36.6 80.1 -39.5 26.6 
Turkey 23.8 34.7 20.0 57.8 
Total 369.9 384.4 151.2 324.4 
 
However, the presence of FDI does not demonstrate that foreign capital is 
actually taking advantage of investment opportunities in export-oriented sectors of 
Kosovo’s economy. Quite the contrary, the overwhelming share of FDI (75.3 per 
cent) is directed into non-tradable sectors (construction and services), whereas only 
slightly over 15 per cent of total FDI flows are absorbed by manufacturing activities 
(Table 6). This explains why existing levels of foreign investment are not closely 
associated with industrialization and export growth (MTI, 2015). According to MTI 
(2015) it also shows that foreign capital inflows in Kosovo effectively contribute to 
establishing economic activities (e.g. services) that maintain and reproduce the 
overall consumptive character of the economy.  
 
Table 6. Kosovo:  Net foreign investment flows, by sector, 2007-2014 
Sector (% of total net FDI flows) 2007 2011 2014 Average 
Agriculture 1.79 0.14 0.11 1.16 
Industry   26.95 10.89 -10.85 15.78 
Construction  1.17 34.63 -13.13 9.1 
Services 66.23 37.89 122.95 66.2 
Other 3.83 16.43 0.91 7.75 
Source: Central Bank of Kosovo Times Series (various years)  
Notes: Averages over the whole time period 
 
The same situation is evidenced elsewhere in the region. Estrin & Uvalic (2013, 
p. 35) explain that “the manufacturing industry, as the key sector for developing 
export potential, has actually continued to decline in most SEE countries also 
during the past decade, after the very strong process of deindustrialization in the 
1990s which has been more extreme than in CEE”. In addition, as International 
Monetary Fund [IMF] (2015) explains, FDI inflows in the region were directed 
into non-tradable sectors, such as financial services, real estate, and construction, 
rather than tradable sectors that can generate stronger export performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Kosovo Privatisation Agency (2015) Annual Report. [Retrieved from].  
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3. FDI and integration into GVCs: bottlenecks and policy 
options 
The SAA has been hailed as a major achievement in policy circles in Kosovo. It 
is argued that, a deal with the world’s largest trading bloc is most attractive, as it will 
provide access to a half of billion consumers in 28 EU member states. Furthermore, 
businesses will benefit from the SAA through creation of a more stable and 
predictable trade and investment environment. Moreover, the SAA will commit 
Kosovo to undertaking major reforms in areas such as intellectual property, public 
procurements, competition policy, and trade and sustainable development. In the 
same light, the literature views the impact of FDI in developing world. It is argued 
that FDI generate jobs, exports, and growth. In addition, spillover effects by FDI 
affect positively local industries, making them more competitive domestically and 
internationally. 
Jointly, free trade and FDI, respectively, create opportunities for a potential 
integration of Kosovo’s industries into global production networks. On the one 
hand, free trade – the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to upstream or 
downstream activities – and the ease of conducting international transactions (i.e. 
trade facilitation) are vital to successful participation in global value chains. 
European and Turkish capital can either integrate Kosovo industries into global 
value chains by acquiring specific chains in the upstream or downstream activities, 
or, as FDI are conventionally viewed, by serving as a channel of technology and 
knowledge transfer vital to increasing Kosovo’s productive capacities and climbing 
up the value chain ladder. 
However, the evidence from developing countries on the benefits of both free 
trade and FDI, respectively, is rather mixed. Regardless whether we talk about 
trade liberalisation or capital inflows, the benefits are conditional on domestic 
conditions. In the case of trade liberalisation, the literature suggests that the 
benefits of free trade are conditional and that export performance in general 
depends on many domestic supply-side factors (see the joint report from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Trade 
Organization and World Bank (OECD/WTO/World Bank, 2014). Hence, in order 
to benefit from free trade, countries have to address supply-side weaknesses if the 
potential benefits of free trade are to be realized. A recent study analyzing Kosovo 
– EU trade determinants reaches the same conclusion (see Gashi, Hisarciklilar, & 
Pugh, 2016).Similarly, a large body of literature argues that potential spillover 
effects of FDI to domestic firms is dependent on local characteristics, including the 
level of human capital and the overall institutional level of the country, including 
the level of development of the financial sector (see Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sayek, 
2009).  
Hence, the policymaking in Kosovo will have to see free trade and FDI in 
conjunction. Through a careful design of policies Kosovo institutions will have to 
use free trade to attractand channel FDI from its two major contributors, namely, the 
EU and Turkey. These policies will later bolster productive capacities of the country 
by brining knowledge and capital, and integrating domestic industries in wider 
international production networks. The new approach will require a refocus from the 
liberal paradigm towards a more non-neutralpolicy approach. This type of thinking is 
gaining prominence in academic circles, especially in relation to attracting foreign 
capital. For instance, the prominent scholar Jagdish Bhagwati in The Defence of 
Globalisation (2004) argues that“…growth was not a passive, trickle-down strategy 
for helping the poor. It was an active, pull-up strategy instead. It required a 
government that would energetically take steps to accelerate growth, through a 
variety of policies including building infrastructure such as roads and ports and 
attracting foreign funds”.In what follows, we develop the argument by drawingfirst 
onthe structural impediments that the EU and Turkish investors may likely face in 
Kosovo, and possible policy solutions. 
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In order to identify the structural impediments investors face in Kosovo, the good 
place to start is the Growth Diagnostics Framework developed by Hausmann, 
Rodrik, & Velasco (2007). According to this approach the government should 
identify the binding constraints the country faces. In other words, the government has 
to be selective in resolving the most burdening constraints to growth and investments 
because the span of economic impediments is wide and of various intensities, while 
the resources, especially institutional, are limited. In this light, Kosovo Government 
has to be selective and tackle the most pressing barriers to the economic activity, 
especially those related to the decisions of firms to invest in Kosovo and the 
decisions related to expanding economic activity of foreign and localoperating in 
Kosovo. In the former case, one should analyse the major motifs for foreign investors 
(i.e. the factors influencing foreign firm decision to enter Kosovo market); while in 
the latter case, one should look through the FDI externalities on the local firms and 
industries.  
Both the decision to enter Kosovo market and the externalities produced by FDI 
are closely related to two major factors: the skill level of human resources and the 
quality of institutions. This does not mean that these are the only factors influencing 
the two types of foreign investor decisions. In addition, we are also aware that the 
impediments to the entry and expansion of foreign firms in Kosovo are industry 
specific. But the overwhelming empirical evidence shows that these two factors have 
a higher pulling force for foreign investors. 
Dunning & Lundan (2008) list the motifs for investing abroad; according to them 
these are market, resource, efficiency, and strategic-asset seeking. Small size of the 
Kosovo’s market and generally weak purchasing power eliminates the market size 
factor. However, Kosovo potentially can be attractive to the EU and Turkey investors 
seeking relatively cheap human and natural resources, on the one hand, and 
efficiency on the other hand. But, using efficiently these resources – human or 
natural – requires meeting specific preconditions. First, Kosovo energy and mineral 
resources are well documented. However, investors in the extractive or industries 
related to natural resources are generally averse to country risks. Kosovo is a high-
risk country; the political and economic risk largely steams from the poor 
institutional infrastructure and the risks related to the political developments after 
1999. Moreover, the rational utilisation of natural resources requires an institutional 
infrastructure build on the principles of transparency and accountability. This would 
reduce the potential impact of interest groups and the poor governance of resources 
that are the main reasons for the emergence of the “resource course”.Second, 
Kosovo’s young and vibrant population presents an enormous potential. However, 
the skill level and composition is questionable. The problems are related largely to 
the underperforming education system. Moreover, as studies show, the highly 
educated workforce in Kosovo is comparatively more expensive than their peers in 
the region (World Bank, 2010). 
The discussion on the effects FDI in the local economy concern, first, the 
expansion of foreign firms’ activities within Kosovo; and, second, creating 
conditionswhich would generate externalities from FDI to local firms and industries. 
Regarding the former, various incentive schemes – tax or other – can be devised to 
support the expansion of activities of the existing FDI. In the second case, the 
situation is much more complex because, the FDI related externalities depend largely 
on the local market conditions. For instance, Alfaro (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2009) 
argue that countries give incentives to foreign investors on the belief that they enable 
domestic industries to absorb technology and knowledge. However, according to the 
authors this does not happen by default. Authors argue that the absorption of 
knowledge and technology is much more likely to occur when some specific 
domestic conditions are met, specifically those related to the quality of human 
resources and the performance of institutions in the country. Problems in each of 
them reduce firms’ capabilities to absorb knowledge and technologies from foreign 
firms, and to react to the challenges and opportunities presented by the entry of 
foreign firms in the local market. For instance, weak financial sector limits the access 
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to the credit, and as a result the possibility of small businesses and entrepreneurs to 
finance new technologies and absorb new knowledge (Alfaro, 2013).     
 
4. Conclusion 
Kosovo has almost entirely liberalized its trade with the world. It has recently 
signed two major trade agreements; namely, the SAA with the EU, and the FTA 
with Turkey. Together with CEFTA, which is in place since 2007, Kosovo has 
liberalized 80 per cent of its trade. However, as the data show, free trade did not 
bring much prosperity and development to the country. Structural problems are 
persisting; unemployment is high while negative trade balance is widening. In line 
with the experiences of the developing world, the research for Kosovo shows that 
trade liberalisation does not ensure economic growth and prosperity, especially 
when the supply-side constraints limit country’s ability to reap the benefits of free 
trade. Violence in the nineties; years of underperforming post-war institutions; the 
slow pace of reforms, especially poorly managed privatisation process; reduced 
greatly Kosovo’s industrial base and its manufacturing capacities.  
Moreover, these factors, accompanied by the problems with the rule of law, 
produced a high-risk environment that deterred the inflow of foreign capital, a vital 
ingredient in building a competitive private sector. However, it was assumed that 
the signing of these two agreements will make Kosovo more attractive to the 
European and Turkish investors. FDIs are assumed to bring new knowledge and 
capital, as well as help local firms and industries to increase the level of their 
competitiveness. In addition, the flow of foreign capital may enable Kosovo’s 
industries to integrate into the global value chains. On the one hand, free trade – 
the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to upstream or downstream activities – 
and the ease of conducting international transactions (i.e. trade facilitation) are vital 
to successful participation in global value chains. On the other hand, European and 
Turkish capital can either integrate Kosovo industries into global value chains by 
acquiring specific chains in the upstream or downstream activities, or, as FDI are 
conventionally viewed, by serving as a channel of technology and knowledge 
transfer vital to increasing Kosovo’s productive capacities and climbing up the 
value chain ladder.  
However, even if this best-case scenario works, other structural impediments in 
Kosovo will likely limit the impact of the foreign capital, and, specifically, 
integration into global value chains. Resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking EU 
and Turkish investors will likely be attracted to Kosovo, but the high degree of 
political risk in Kosovo and the lack of skilled and educated labour force will limit 
full benefits from FDI. The Government of Kosovo will have to sort its own 
backyard and create conditions to maximize the impact of free trade and foreign 
investment flows. 
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